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Abstract 
If terror attacks from groups of one country are followed by similar attacks on the same target 
from groups of other similar countries, then this could be the consequence of contagion. 
However, just because one terror incident follows another does not necessarily imply that the 
former is caused by the latter or, in other words, that terror attacks are what is called spatially 
dependent. Rather, both incidents could have been triggered by the same underlying cause. 
This is known as Galton’s problem. One area where this problem is particularly prevalent is 
international terrorism. According to Huntington, international terrorism is contagious 
because of civilizational rallying effects. If radical groups from one country attack targets 
from a country of another civilization, then groups from other countries of the same 
civilization as the initial terrorist groups will become more likely to also attack this target. 
Any test of this hypothesis has to solve Galton’s problem and thus to disentangle spatial 
dependence from spatial clustering of attacks and common shocks and trends, which affect 
similar groups from different countries similarly. Accounting for such potentially 
confounding effects, we nevertheless find evidence for spatial dependence in international 
terrorism along civilizational lines in the post-Cold War period and particularly so for specific 
inter-civilizational combinations. However, while contagion consistent with Huntington’s 
predictions exists, spatial dependence seems to have a substantively small effect on patterns 
of international terrorism. 
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1. Introduction 
Terrorist attacks are unlikely to be independent of each other (Midlarsky et al. 1980; 
Hamilton and Hamilton 1983; Drakos and Gofas 2006; Braithwaite and Li 2007). If a terrorist 
group conducts a successful terrorist attack, it will more likely attempt to launch similar 
attacks in the future. Single groups thus often conduct what is known as ‘terror campaigns’, 
which leads to temporal dependence in attacks. Similarly, different groups pursue similar 
goals or compete with each other for attention and support.1 As a consequence, they are likely 
to choose similar strategies. Again, terrorist attacks are contagious, this time leading to spatial 
dependence. 
While terrorism can thus be contagious for very different reasons, Samuel Huntington 
(1996) has suggested the arguably most prominent explanation for spatial dependence in 
international terrorism. According to Huntington (1993a, 1993b, 1996), civilizational rallying 
effects draw individuals and extremist groups from different countries but the same 
civilization into conducting attacks on targets from a country of another civilization if other 
groups from the same civilization attack victims from this country. If this holds, then a 
terrorist attack from a, say, Pakistani group on British targets should increase the probability 
of other Islamic groups also attacking British targets. 
Yet, researchers must be careful in interpreting spatially related terrorist attacks from 
similar groups on the same target as evidence for implicit coalition formation between 
terrorist groups. In fact, similar terrorist attacks could also be caused by an increase in 
competition between terrorist groups which compete for scarce support and attention. This 
would also lead to spatial dependence in terrorist attacks, but for very different reasons than 
rallying. Likewise, spatial clustering may also occur when groups face similar underlying 
incentives. In this case, terrorist groups may act perfectly independent from each other, but 
                                                 
1
  Elsewhere, we discussed this logic in greater detail. See Plümper and Neumayer (2010b) and Neumayer 
and Plümper (2010a). 
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researchers could erroneously interpret their findings as evidence for spatial dependence. 
Clearly, if one individual opens an umbrella after another has already done so, the reason is 
unlikely to be any contagious effect in the use of umbrellas but simply the fact that it rains. 
Likewise, if two terror groups conduct similar attacks they may well respond to the same 
incentives for doing so rather than trying to support each other. If terrorist groups spatially 
depend on each other, then one group attacks a particular target because another group has 
already attacked the same target. If, however, spatial patterns result from spatial clustering or 
common shocks and trends, then two similar groups attack the same target because they are 
independently stimulated by the same incentive structure or change in incentive structure. 
Social scientists know the apparent observational similarity between the consequences of 
common trends and shocks as well as spatial clustering on the one hand and the consequences 
of spatial dependency on the other as Galton’s (1889) problem. If either spatial clustering or 
common shocks and trends are not adequately modeled, then an analysis might spuriously 
suggest spatial dependence. In other words, the challenge is to identify the true spatial 
dependence effect. Identification rests on the assumption that all the spatial pattern of the 
dependent variable that has nothing to do with spatial dependence itself is fully explained by 
the independent variables other than the spatial lag. This is a strong assumption and if it does 
not hold then the estimated coefficients for the variables capturing the spatial dependence 
effects are likely to be biased. 
In this paper, we use model specification techniques for the analysis of spatial 
dependence, which we have discussed in greater detail elsewhere (Plümper and Neumayer 
2010a), to separate spatial dependence from spatial clustering and common shocks and trends. 
As a first step, we include civilization dyad-specific dummy variables into our analysis to 
control for spatial clustering in the levels of international terrorism. Put simply, these controls 
account for the fact that some civilizational combinations have a higher a priori propensity to 
experience international terrorism even after controlling for the confounding variables and in 
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the absence of any spatial spillover effects. We will then, additionally, include civilization 
dyad-specific time trends to control for spatial clustering in the changes of international 
terrorism. These account for the fact that some civilizational combinations are more prone to 
experience increases or decreases in international terrorism over time. All specifications 
include year-specific time dummy variables to account for changes in terror propensity over 
time common to all dyads. All models also include time-varying variables capturing the 
general terror propensity of both potential terror and potential target countries. 
We conduct two types of analyses: first, we try to identify general inter-civilizational 
rallying effects, distinguishing between the Cold War and the post-Cold War period. 
According to Huntington, a rallying effect occurs in the latter but not in the former period. 
And second, we focus on three inter-civilizational combinations, which Huntington identifies 
as particularly prone to international terrorism, namely the clashes between non-Western and 
the Western civilizations, between the Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations and, particularly, 
between the Islamic and the Western civilizations. 
Our results provide support for the general rallying hypothesis in the post-Cold War 
period. The more stringent we control for confounding factors, the smaller the estimated 
coefficient of the spatial lag variable capturing the civilizational rallying effect becomes, but 
it remains statistically significant throughout. If, additionally, we condition the spatial lag 
variables on the three inter-civilizational combinations identified by Huntington, then we also 
find evidence suggesting the existence of rallying effects in the post-Cold War period. 
However, in substantive terms these spatial spillover effects are relatively modest. While 
existent, they therefore do not seem to play an important role in determining patterns of 
international terrorism. 
Our paper contributes to two important, yet separate literatures. First, we contribute to 
the rapidly growing literature on international terrorism by analyzing whether international 
terrorist events are contagious along civilizational lines. Second, we also show the importance 
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of correctly identifying spatial dependence by accounting for spatial clustering, common 
shocks and common trends. Our analysis demonstrates how failure to control for confounding 
factors leads to an overestimation of spatial dependence. While our analysis is on patterns of 
international terrorism, it is likely to have relevance in many other areas of social science 
research as well.  
 
2. Civilizational Rallying and International Terrorism 
At first glance, data on international terrorist incidents seemingly lend support to the potential 
existence of civilizational rallying effects. Table 1 lists the number of terror incidents for each 
year from 1968 to 2005, together with a breakdown into terror incidents that are intra-
civilizational (terrorists and victims belong to the same civilization) and inter-civilizational 
(terrorists and victims belong to different civilizations). Interestingly, a large share and in 
many years even the majority of international terrorism is inter-civilizational. Also, the share 
of inter-civilizational terror incidents seems to have increased after the end of the Cold War. 
Data reported in Neumayer and Plümper (2009, tables 2 and 3) show that Westerners are the 
main target of inter-civilizational terrorism in general as well as of Islamic terrorists in 
particular and that the Islamic civilization is the most prone to inter-civilizational terrorism. 
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Table 1. Total and inter-civilizational terror incidents over time (1968 to 2005). 
 
year   total incidents   intra-civilizational   inter-civililzational   share inter-civilizational 
1968 59 25 34 57.63 
1969 54 18 36 66.67 
1970 126 41 85 67.46 
1971 98 36 62 63.27 
1972 107 41 66 61.68 
1973 171 111 60 35.09 
1974 197 109 88 44.67 
1975 176 91 85 48.30 
1976 194 120 74 38.14 
1977 186 109 77 41.40 
1978 128 73 55 42.97 
1979 180 105 75 41.67 
1980 269 151 118 43.87 
1981 258 129 129 50.00 
1982 222 123 99 44.59 
1983 240 111 129 53.75 
1984 258 128 130 50.39 
1985 281 159 122 43.42 
1986 258 123 135 52.33 
1987 274 167 107 39.05 
1988 206 111 95 46.12 
1989 160 75 85 53.13 
1990 234 120 114 48.72 
1991 315 162 153 48.57 
1992 194 109 85 43.81 
1993 223 90 133 59.64 
1994 216 76 140 64.81 
1995 151 46 105 69.54 
1996 134 50 84 62.69 
1997 113 49 64 56.64 
1998 45 10 35 77.78 
1999 211 31 180 85.31 
2000 117 45 72 61.54 
2001 30 8 22 73.33 
2002 79 17 62 78.48 
2003 102 17 85 83.33 
2004 93 30 63 67.74 
2005 62 29 33 53.23 
 
Source: Own computations from Iterate. 
 
One possible explanation for the rapid increase in inter-civilizational terrorism has been put 
forward by Samuel Huntington. Based on his broader argument that individuals, groups, and 
governments primarily identify themselves and are identified by others as belonging to a 
particular civilization, he argues that the conflict between a terrorist group from one 
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civilization and countries from another civilization draws in other groups from the same 
civilization as the terrorists. Huntington (1993a: 38) accepts that “civilization rallying to date 
has been limited”, but he maintains that “it has been growing, and it clearly has the potential 
to spread much further.” 
While Huntington argues that after the end of the Cold War “the principal conflicts of 
global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations” (Huntington 
1993a: 22), i.e. by the clash of civilizations, he is not very clear on what exactly he means by 
the term clash (Bassin 2007). Apparently, many forms of violent conflict are subsumed under 
the umbrella notion of clash. Importantly from the perspective of this article, Huntington 
regards terrorism as one important form of clash, used particularly by the weaker side in inter-
civilizational clashes: “terrorism historically is the weapon of the weak” (Huntington 1996: 
187). He makes specific predictions about the relative propensity of civilizations to use 
terrorism in their conflict with other civilizations. Specifically, he suggests the excessive use 
of terrorism in the conflict between non-Western civilizations and the West, between the 
Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations and, particularly, between Islam and the West 
(Huntington 1996: 188, 263ff.; Huntington 2002). To do justice to Huntington’s paradigm, in 
this article we will test the two hypotheses that after the end of the Cold War international 
terrorism is contagious along civilizational lines in general as well as that it is contagious for 
the specific inter-civilizational combinations identified by Huntington as most prone to the 
use of this particular form of conflict. 
 
3. Variables, Estimation Technique and Sample 
In this section, we describe the dependent and control variables. In the following section, we 
will discuss in some detail the model specification techniques that allow us to deal with 
Galton’s problem by disentangling spatial dependence from spatial clustering, common 
shocks and common time trends. 
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Dependent Variable 
Our source for data on international terrorism is the “International Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorist Events” (Iterate) dataset (Mickolus et al. 2003). It defines terror as “the use, or 
threat of use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by any 
individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, 
when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a target group wider 
than the immediate victims” (ibid.: 2). Acts of terror include, among others, assassinations, 
bombings and armed attacks, arson and fire, kidnapping, and skyjacking, unless they are acts 
of ordinary crime or the violence is for purposes other than political (e.g., for drug trafficking 
purposes), and unless the violence is committed during international and civil wars. Attacks 
by guerrilla groups are only included if they inflict damage on civilian targets or the 
dependents of military personnel (Mickolus, Sandler and Murdock 1989: xii). Iterate is a very 
comprehensive database that codes, amongst others, the nationality of both terrorists and the 
victims of their attacks. The unit of observation in our sample is the directed country dyad 
year and our dependent variable is the annual sum of terrorist incidents originating from a 
specific country on targets from another specific country. It does not matter where the act of 
terrorism took place, whether in the terrorists’, victims’ or a third country. 
To be on the conservative side, we do not include terrorism committed by “Indeterminate 
Arabs, Palestine”, since we cannot allocate these to a specific country. Our results are, 
however, robust to allocating each of these terror attacks to a randomly drawn Arab country. 
Using nationality to determine the civilizational belonging of terrorists and victims can, at 
times, be misleading. In the 7/7 attacks on the London Underground system, for example, the 
terrorists were Muslims with British citizenship, which would fail to be included as inter-
civilizational terrorism, even though it may qualify as such given the apparent Islamist and 
anti-Western motivations of the terrorists. Such measurement error is likely to bias the results 
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against finding evidence for Huntington’s predictions. However, our test for changes in 
spillover effects after the end of the Cold War is likely to be affected less, unless such 
apparent measurement error has become stronger during the post-Cold War period. We 
exclude terror attacks on Israeli targets or perpetrated by Israeli terrorists. This is because, 
first, Israel is one of those cases in which it is not clear how Huntington classifies the 
civilizational belonging.2 Second, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians as well as 
Arab nations is very peculiar and its inclusion would risk biasing our results. Our results are, 
however, fully robust to including attacks from Israeli terrorists and attacks on Israeli targets. 
 
Control Variables 
As structural determinants of international terrorism we include the log of per capita income, 
the level of democracy and the logged population size of both the terrorists’ origin country 
and the victims’ target country. This follows arguments provided by Krueger and Laitin 
(2008) and Abadie (2006) on welfare and terrorism. Richer country targets are strategically 
more attractive to terrorists, not least because such attacks generate greater media attention. 
Poorer countries may generate more terrorism, even though the link between per capita 
income and a country’s propensity to generate terrorist attacks is controversial. Democracies 
are said to suffer more from terrorism (Li 2005; Enders and Sandler 2006; Kydd and Walter 
2006), but the link between regime type in the terrorists’ home country and international 
terrorism is again somewhat controversial (Li 2005). We also control for the population size 
of both countries to account for the simple fact that ceteris paribus more populous countries 
will generate more terrorism and suffer more from terrorism. Data on income and population 
are taken from World Bank (2006), data on democracy from the Polity IV project 
                                                 
2
  In Russett, Oneal and Cox’s (2000) classification Israel is part of the West, whereas in 
Henderson and Tucker’s (2001) classification it is not part of the Western or any other 
civilization. 
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(http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/). Lastly, we control for the fact that contiguity of two 
countries as well as geographical proximity lowers the costs for terrorists to execute terror 
acts against foreign nationals. The natural log of the distance between the capital cities of two 
countries and a dummy variable for contiguity by land or separation by sea of less than 150 
miles are taken from www.eugenesoftware.org. 
One final complication that comes with the Iterate dataset is that it contains incidents in 
which the main nationality of the terrorists and the victims are the same. These nevertheless 
do not represent purely domestic terrorism because some other aspect of the incident or its 
resolution transcends national boundaries and makes these incidents international, which is 
why they are included in Iterate. However, these are cases in which the distinction between 
international and domestic terrorism is somewhat blurred, which may amount to some form of 
measurement error. In the main estimations shown below, we control for this potential error 
by including a dummy variable that is set to one for all incidents in which the main nationality 
of the terrorists and their targets are the same. Our results are fully robust to not including 
such a dummy variable as well as robust to excluding all such incidents from the sample. In 
other words, this apparent source of bias does not have a significant effect on our results. 
 
Estimation technique and sample 
Our dependent variable is a count variable (number of terrorist incidents). To account for 
over-dispersion, which is very prominent in the data, we use a negative binomial model, 
which is more reliable than the Poisson model for this kind of data. We employ standard 
errors adjusted for clustering on country dyads. Our sample covers annual observations over 
the period 1970 to 2005 and up to 150 countries, which form what is called directed country 
dyads with each other such that each country is linked to each other country once as a 
potential home country of terrorists and once as a potential target country. Due to missing 
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data on the explanatory variables not all possible country dyads are included over the entire 
period. 
The dependent variable has a large number of zeros. In such situations, researchers 
sometimes employ an estimation model known as the zero-inflated negative binomial model 
or an alternative model known as a hurdle model. Both models rest on problematic 
assumptions, however. The hurdle model combines a binary model to predict values of zero 
with another, usually zero-truncated Poisson or zero-truncated negative binomial, model to 
predict non-zero values. Its underlying assumption is that different mechanisms account for 
zeros than for the distribution of non-zeros (Hilbe 2007). We doubt whether this estimation 
procedure is consistent with the underlying data generating process of international terrorism. 
The zero-inflated negative binomial model assumes that some dyad years do not experience 
international terrorism with probability of one (Long and Freese 2006) – which seems to be 
inconsistent with empirical evidence and for which there is no obvious theoretical justification 
either. 
The inclusion of spatial lag variables necessarily introduces some endogeneity bias. The 
same is true for variables controlling for the terror propensity of terror and target countries, 
which we include for reasons to be explained in the following section. Lagging the variables 
by one period can only very partially address the bias (our results are fully robust to lagging 
these variables by one period). Fortunately, the endogeneity bias is likely to be small. Hays 
and Franzese (2009) suggest that using an estimation model in which ln(y+1) rather than y 
itself enters the spatial effect variable performs well in terms of bias and root mean squared 
error. They demonstrate this result for Monte Carlo simulations using a Poisson estimator, but 
the results should carry over to the negative binomial case. We therefore use ln(y+1) in the 
generation of the spatial effect and the terror propensity variables. 
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4.  Disentangling Spatial Dependence from Spatial Clustering and Common Trends 
and Shocks  
In spatial econometrics, model specification is arguably even more important than in many 
other analyses. Failure to control for, for example, common shocks and trends in the data 
generating process has more severe consequences in spatial than in standard panel data 
analysis since it directly affects the estimated coefficient for the spatial lag. Such failure will 
typically cause largely biased coefficients of the spatial lag variables and can lead to wrong 
inferences. In this section, we explain model specification techniques that allow us to account 
for Galton’s problem. 
 
The Spatial Lag Variable 
In order to model spatial dependence, one needs to construct what is known as a spatial lag 
variable. Such a variable consists of the dependent variable in other country dyads weighted 
by some weighting or connectivity matrix (Anselin 1988). In our case, the spatial lag variable 
consists of the amount of terrorism in other dyads formed by the same specific target country 
with other (potential) terrorist home countries, but only if the terrorist source countries of the 
other dyads belong to the same civilization as the source country in the country dyad under 
observation, while the terror and the target country belong to different civilizations. In other 
words, the connectivity or weighting matrix measures the civilizational belonging of the 
terrorist and target countries and is set to one if, simultaneously, the terrorist countries share 
the same civilization, but a different civilization from the target country, and zero otherwise. 
Instead of merely counting current terror incidents in other countries, we use the sum of terror 
incidents of the current and prior two years for the creation of the spatial lag variable. The 
reason is that contagion may take some time as groups need to prepare terror attacks. 
Formally, let i stand for the source country of the (potential) terrorists and j for the target 
country of the (potential) victims. The ‘civilizational rallying’ variable represents what we 
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have dubbed specific source contagion elsewhere.3 It is the sum of all terror incidents in the 
current and prior two years from all countries of the same civilization to which country i 
belongs (minus terrorism of the specific country i that forms the dyadic unit of observation 
with country j) on targets of the specific country j under observation, which is from another 
civilization than i. Ignoring other control variables for the moment and keeping in mind that, 
following Hays and Franzese (2009), we use ln(y+1) rather than y itself in the creation of the 
spatial lag variable, this can be expressed as: 
 
1
2
ln( 1) ...
t
ijt ik ijtkjm
k i m t
y w yβ ε
≠ = −
= + + +∑ ∑  (1) 
 
where yijt is the number of terror attacks from terrorists of country i on targets from country j 
in year t. 
2
ln( 1)
t
ik kjm
k i m t
w y
≠ = −
+∑ ∑  is the spatial lag variable that consists of two elements: a 
weighting matrix, symbolized by ikw , which is multiplied by the spillover or “spatial y” 
variable, symbolized by 
2
ln( 1)
t
kjm
m t
y
= −
+∑ . The “spatial y” is the natural log of one plus the sum 
of terror attacks by individuals from countries other than country i, called countries k, on 
targets from the same target country j in this year and the prior two years. The weighting 
matrix is set to one if, at the same time, country i and countries k belong to the same 
civilization and country j belongs to a different civilization, and zero otherwise. 1β  is the 
estimated coefficient of the spatial lag variable, the dots stand for control variables and ijtε  is 
an error term. A positive 1β  that is statistically significantly different from zero would suggest 
that terrorism by terrorists from country i on targets from country j of a different civilization 
                                                 
3
  See Neumayer and Plümper (2010b) for a classification and discussion of all possible forms of 
modeling spatial dependence in dyadic data. 
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rises with higher terrorism by terrorists from other countries k of the same civilization as 
country i on targets of the same country j. For example, if terrorists from other Latin 
American countries attack US citizens, then this might raise terrorism from Colombian 
terrorists on US citizens. 
To create this spatial lag variable we need information on the civilizational belonging of 
countries and their correct classification is clearly of great importance. Defining civilizations 
as “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people 
have”, being “differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition, and, most 
important, religion” (ibid.: 25), Huntington identifies seven, or possibly eight, civilizations – 
Western, Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and, possibly, 
African. Unfortunately, he does not provide a clear list of the civilizational belonging of 
countries in his work. Information has to be gathered indirectly from a map of countries of the 
world, in which he has drawn civilizational information. This does not provide unambiguous 
information and critics have also noted that he is not entirely consistent in his verbal 
descriptions on which country belongs to which civilization (Russett, Oneal and Cox’s 2000; 
Henderson and Tucker 2001). We use Russett, Oneal and Cox’s (2000) classification, but our 
results are robust to using Henderson and Tucker’s (2001) classification instead. 
 
Modeling Spatial Clustering 
Spatial patterns in international terrorism do not need to be caused by spatial dependence. 
Instead, these patterns can be caused by spatial correlation in other factors influencing or 
stimulating the dependent variable. Observable as well as unobservable phenomena such as 
contiguity and geographical distance, political cultures and customs, preferences and 
perceptions, constitutions and institutions, and so on are typically spatially clustered, which 
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can lead to spatial patterns in the dependent variable even in the absence of spatial 
dependence.4 
A popular method for mitigating the problem created by spatial clustering is the inclusion 
of fixed effects. Such models take out all of the between variation in the data and are 
estimated based on the within variation of the data in each observational unit only. This 
reduces bias because any spatial clustering or unobserved spatial heterogeneity in terrorism 
levels are fully captured by the fixed effects. However, the inclusion of fixed effects not only 
makes the estimates less efficient (Plümper et al. 2005; Plümper and Troeger 2007), spatial 
clustering in changes in the level of terrorism may also still bias the estimates of the spatial 
lag and calls for the modeling of common shocks and common trends (Plümper and 
Neumayer 2010a), to which we turn further below. 
To account for spatial clustering in inter-civilizational patterns of international terrorism, 
we include civilization dyad-specific dummy variables into the estimation model. These 
account for the fact that some pairs of civilizations are simply more prone to experience 
international terrorism even in the absence of any civilizational rallying effects. They also 
appropriately account for spatially clustered incentive structures common to inter-
civilizational combinations. In comparison, country dyad-specific fixed effects would remove 
all level effects in international terrorism from our estimates given that the unit of observation 
is the country dyad year. They would thus very likely capture some of the spatial dependence 
via civilizational rallying effect that we seek to isolate from spatial clustering. Accordingly, 
                                                 
4
  Franzese and Hays (2008) discuss the source and nature of this problem in some detail. If the 
determinants of spatial patterns in the dependent variable are observed (i.e. the regressors show 
spatial patterns), one often refers to this as spatial clustering, whereas unobserved spatial 
patterns are usually called unobserved spatial heterogeneity (spatial patterns in errors). For the 
purpose of the analysis here, as a shortcut we mainly use the term spatial clustering to cover 
both observed and unobserved spatial heterogeneity. 
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the inclusion of country dyad-specific fixed effects would probably lead us to under-estimate 
spatial dependence. In other words, the inclusion of civilization dyad-specific dummy 
variables avoids an over-estimation of spatial dependence that would follow from failing to 
account for spatial clustering, but also avoids the under-estimation of spatial dependence that 
would follow from the inclusion of country dyad-specific fixed effects. 
Formally, the inclusion of civilization dyad-specific dummy variables leads us into 
extending equation (1) to: 
 
1
2
ln( 1) ...
t
ijt ik c ijtkjm
k i m t
y w uyβ ε
≠ = −
= + + + +∑ ∑ , (2) 
 
where cu  are the time-invariant fixed effects, representing the 28 possible inter-civilizational 
combinations. 
 
Modeling Common Shocks and Common Trends 
The problem of modeling common shocks and common trends is widely discussed in the 
theoretical literature on spatial econometrics (e.g., Beck et al. 2006; Franzese and Hays 2007; 
Plümper and Neumayer 2010a), and methodologists usually suggest that applied researchers 
control for common trends by adding the lagged dependent variable to the list of regressors 
(e.g., Hays 2003, Franzese and Hays 2007, Swank 2006) and account for common shocks by 
adding period-specific time dummies (e.g. Bailey and Rom 2004; Franzese and Hays 2007). 
Following this advice, we include year-specific time dummy variables to account for common 
shocks. However, as concerns common trends we have chosen a different modeling option. 
First, we include a variable that measures the total annual sum of terrorism originating from 
country i (independent of the target country of the victims but minus the number of terror 
incidents in the dyad under observation) and another variable that measures the total annual 
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sum of terrorism suffered by individuals from country j (independent of the origin or source 
country of the terrorists but, again, minus the number of incidents in the dyad under 
observation). The purpose of these variables is to account for the general, but time-varying, 
terror propensity of terrorists’ home and the target countries, respectively. As with the spatial 
lag variables, these variables enter in logged form for the reasons explained in section 3. 
Second, we include civilization dyad-specific time trends to account for common trends and 
dynamics in all countries of a particular inter-civilizational combination. These extensions to 
equation (2) lead to: 
 
1 2 3
2 , ,
ln( 1) ln( 1) ln( 1) ...
t
ijt ik int njt c c t ijtkjm
k i m t n i j n i j
y w y y u u year Tyβ β β ε
≠ = − ≠ ≠
= + + + + + + + ⋅ + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ (3) 
 
where 
,
int
n i j
y
≠
∑  is the time-varying general terror propensity of (potential) terror country i, 
,
njt
n i j
y
≠
∑  is the time-varying general terror propensity of (potential) target country j, cu year⋅  
represent civilization dyad-specific time trends, while tT  capture global year-specific time 
fixed effects. In sum, estimation equation (3) represents a conservative research design. If we 
find evidence for spatial dependence in this design, we can be fairly certain that such evidence 
is not spurious. 
 
5. Results 
We first present in table 2 estimation results, in which the spatial lag variables are only 
conditioned on the Cold War (1970 to 1989) and post-Cold War periods (1990 to 2005) and 
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no distinction is made according to specific inter-civilizational combinations.5 A statistically 
significant coefficient of the spatial lag variable in the post-Cold War period would suggest 
spatial dependence during this period, while a statistically significant positive difference 
between the coefficients of the post-Cold War and Cold War spatial lag variables would 
suggest a significant increase in spatial dependence after the end of the Cold War.6 Both 
effects would be consistent with Huntington’s predictions. The first model in table 2 excludes 
civilization dyad-specific dummy variables and time trends and therefore is likely to lead to 
an upward biased coefficient of the spatial lag variable. The second model includes 
civilization dyad-specific dummy variables, while the third model additionally includes 
civilization dyad-specific time trends. This last specification is the most stringent and 
conservative one. 
 
                                                 
5
  We let the post-Cold War period start in 1990, but our results are fully robust to a start up to two 
years prior or after this date. Our sample starts in 1970 since with the inclusion of the spatial lag 
variables we lose the first two years of the Iterate dataset. 
6
  Testing for whether the difference between the two estimated coefficients is statistically 
significantly different from zero is similar to tests for a kind of structural break at the end of the 
Cold War that others have done (Chiozza 2002; Bolks and Stoll 2003; Gartzke and Gleditsch 
2006). 
20 
Table 2. Estimation results with spatial lags conditioned on Cold War versus post-Cold War 
periods only. 
 
 model 1 
Civilization dyad  
dummies excluded 
model 2 
Civilization dyad  
dummies included 
model 3 
Civilization dyad 
dummies  
and trends included 
specific source contagion (ln) 0.0782** 0.0589** 0.0551** 
   (Cold War period) (0.0205) (0.0186) (0.0183) 
specific source contagion (ln) 0.105** 0.0865** 0.0607** 
   (post-Cold War period) (0.0193) (0.0176) (0.0186) 
pop terror country (ln) 0.194** 0.274** 0.284** 
 (0.0293) (0.0344) (0.0346) 
pop target country (ln) 0.460** 0.521** 0.523** 
 (0.0366) (0.0425) (0.0427) 
distance (ln) -0.316** -0.245** -0.251** 
 (0.0350) (0.0328) (0.0329) 
common border  0.289 0.288 0.269 
 (0.259) (0.190) (0.190) 
GDP pc terror country (ln) -0.0949* -0.0792 -0.103* 
 (0.0372) (0.0516) (0.0526) 
GDP pc target country (ln) 0.445** 0.439** 0.448** 
 (0.0362) (0.0500) (0.0505) 
democracy terror country -0.00235 -0.00255 0.00226 
 (0.00596) (0.00649) (0.00645) 
democracy target country 0.00782 -0.00306 -0.00160 
 (0.00732) (0.00877) (0.00896) 
terror propensity terror country (ln) 1.274** 1.221** 1.198** 
 (0.0339) (0.0338) (0.0342) 
terror propensity target country (ln) 0.685** 0.616** 0.626** 
 (0.0637) (0.0540) (0.0532) 
same nationality 2.554** 2.586** 2.564** 
 (0.318) (0.303) (0.305) 
Observations 567413 567413 567413 
Chi-square test: equal coefficients  
(p-value) 
2.86 
(0.09) 
3.20 
(0.07) 
0.11 
(0.74) 
 
Standard errors clustered on country dyad in brackets. Year dummies always included. 
* p(z)<0.05 ** p(z)<0.01. 
 
Before turning to the estimated coefficients of the spatial lag variables, which are our main 
interest, we briefly discuss results on the control variables. As expected, both population sizes 
of the terrorists’ home country and of the target country have a positive effect. In other words, 
more populous countries generate more terrorism and suffer more from terrorism. As with 
many other forms of violent conflict, distance matters: The number of terrorist incidents dec-
lines as the geographical distance between the terrorists’ home country and the target country 
increases. Contiguous country dyads do not experience more international terrorism, however. 
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We find evidence that a higher per capita income in the terrorists’ home country lowers 
terrorism (except in model 2), even though our results say of course nothing on the economic 
conditions faced by the individual terrorists themselves. As expected, targets from richer 
countries are more attractive to international terrorists. The type of regime has no impact on 
patterns of international terrorism in either the terrorists’ home country or the target country. 
Conditional on the other explanatory variables and particularly controlling for per capita 
income, which is highly correlated with democracy, as well as the general terror propensity of 
terrorists’ home and target countries, democracies do not differ from autocracies. As 
expected, a higher general propensity of nationals from the origin country to generate 
terrorism raises terrorism for country dyads formed by this country. Similarly, a higher 
general propensity of nationals from the target country to suffer from terrorism raises 
terrorism for dyads in which this country is the target country of the directed country dyad. 
Turning now to the specific source contagion spatial lag variables, which capture 
Huntington’s civilizational rallying hypothesis, we find that the coefficients for the spatial lag 
variables are statistically significantly different from zero in the Cold War and the post-Cold 
War period in all model specifications. While the coefficients become smaller the more 
stringent and conservative our estimation strategy, there is nevertheless evidence consistent 
with Huntington’s hypothesis of a rallying effect even in the model that includes both 
civilization dyad dummies and trends. However, the difference in the estimated coefficients 
between the two time periods is only statistically significant even at the more generous 10 per 
cent level in models 1 and 2. Moreover, with more than half a million observations standard 
errors tend to be low and coefficients are often statistically significant even if the substantive 
importance of effects can be small. This is what we find for the spatial lag variables: in model 
3, a one standard deviation increase in the spatial lag variables during the Cold War and post-
Cold War period lead to an increase of only 4.4 and 5.2 per cent, respectively, in the expected 
rate of terror incidents (other variables at mean values). In comparison, a one standard 
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deviation increase in the population size and per capita income of the target country increases 
the expected count of terror incidents by 125 and 104 per cent, respectively, while a one 
standard deviation increase in the terror propensity of the terror country raises the expected 
count by 128 per cent. Even a move from minimum to maximum in the post-Cold War spatial 
lag variable increases the expected count of terror incidents only by a relatively modest 89 per 
cent. 
Next, we focus on Huntington’s argument that terrorism is more likely to be used in some 
inter-civilizational conflicts than in others and particularly in the clash between the Muslim 
world and the West. Thus, in the models reported in table 3 we no longer simply look at 
global spatial dependence in international terrorism, but we model more carefully 
Huntington’s proposition that terrorism is a weapon used more in some inter-civilizational 
conflicts than in others. In table 3, we take the spatial lag variable, which has already been 
conditioned on the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, and condition it further on specific 
inter-civilizational combinations. Table 3 exclusively reports coefficients of the specific 
source contagion spatial lag variables since the coefficients of the control variables remain 
robust and do not matter for testing Huntington’s rallying prediction. To save space, we only 
show two sets of estimations each, namely the one without civilization dyad-specific controls 
and the one with both civilization dyad-specific dummies and time trends included. 
Starting with the non-Western against Western combination (models 4 and 5), we find 
evidence for civilizational rallying effects in both model specifications for dyads falling into 
the non-Western vs. Western civilizational combination for both the Cold War and the post-
Cold War period. The coefficients are slightly larger in the post-Cold War period, but not 
significantly so. As before, the substantive impact of the rallying effect remains small. A one 
standard deviation increase in the post-Cold War spatial lag variable leads to a 18.9 (model 4) 
and 10.7 per cent (model 5) increase in the expected rate of terror incidents. 
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Models 6 and 7 condition the spatial lag variables on the Islam versus non-Islamic 
civilizational combinations, whereas models 8 and 9 do the same for the Islam versus West 
combinations. For both combinations, there is evidence for civilizational rallying effects in 
the post-Cold War period in both model specifications. Moreover, the coefficients of the 
spatial lag variable increase significantly from the Cold War to the post-Cold War period. In 
fact, the spatial lag coefficients are not even significantly different from zero in the Cold War 
period, suggesting that there was no rallying effect during this time period for dyads of the 
Islam versus non-Islam and Islam versus West combinations. For the other combinations, 
there is some evidence for rallying effects in both periods, but the coefficient either decreases 
in the post-Cold War period or if it increases, the difference is far from statistically 
significant.  
As before, in substantive terms the rallying effect seems to be rather small though. A one 
standard deviation increase in the respective spatial lag variables raises the expected count of 
terrorist incidents by between 17.8 and 9 per cent (Islam versus Rest) and by 29.9 and 15.5 
per cent (Islam versus West) in the post-Cold War period, depending on whether civilization 
dyad dummies and time trends are included in the model specification or not (all other 
variables at mean values). While certainly larger than the estimated substantive effects for all 
inter-civilizational combinations, these estimated effects are still relatively modest. 
Altogether, there is thus evidence for Huntington’s rallying effect in all models, including the 
most stringently and conservatively specified ones, but the rallying effect, whilst existent, 
seems to be relatively small in size. 
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Table 4. Estimation results with spatial lags conditioned on specific inter-civilizational combinations and Cold War versus post-Cold War periods. 
 model 4 model 5 model 6 model 7 model 8 model 9 
Civilization dyad dummies and time trends no yes no yes no yes 
Coeff. specific inter-civilizational comb.: Non-Western 
vs. West 
Non-Western 
vs. West 
Islam vs. 
non-Islam 
Islam vs. 
non-Islam 
Islam vs. 
West 
Islam vs. 
West 
Specific source contagion Cold War (ln) 0.0788** 0.0556** 0.0145 0.00811 0.0156 0.00793 
 (0.0205) (0.0183) (0.0305) (0.0318) (0.0304) (0.0318) 
Specific source contagion post-Cold War (ln) 0.104** 0.0600** 0.113** 0.0616** 0.108** 0.0569* 
 (0.0192) (0.0186) (0.0211) (0.0227) (0.0209) (0.0226) 
Chi-square test: equal coefficients (p-value) 2.60 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.79) 
17.62 
(0.00) 
3.40 
(0.07) 
16.14 
(0.00) 
2.87 
(0.09) 
       
Coeff. specific inter-civilizational comb.: Other Other Other Other Other Other 
Specific source contagion Cold War (ln) -0.216 -0.152 0.0933** 0.0686** 0.0933** 0.0690** 
 (0.179) (0.174) (0.0202) (0.0192) (0.0202) (0.0192) 
Specific source contagion post-Cold War (ln) 0.246* 0.106 0.0847** 0.0566* 0.0943** 0.0634** 
 (0.117) (0.124) (0.0263) (0.0243) (0.0262) (0.0241) 
Chi-square test: equal coefficients (p-value) 4.96 
(0.03) 
1.61 
(0.20) 
0.19 
(0.66) 
0.38 
(0.54) 
0.00 
(0.96) 
0.08 
(0.78) 
       
Observations 567413 567413 567413 567413 567413 567413 
 
Standard errors clustered on country dyad in brackets. Control variables and year dummies always included. * p(z)<0.05 ** p(z)<0.01. 
 
25 
6. Conclusion 
In this article, we have tested the hypothesis that international terrorism is spatially dependent along 
civilizational lines in the post-Cold War period and particularly so for certain inter-civilizational 
combinations. We found indeed evidence for this: even when we control for common trends and 
shocks and spatial clustering, the estimated coefficients of the spatial lag variable remain 
statistically significantly different from zero in the post-Cold War period. While the post-Cold War 
period coefficients are not higher than the ones from the Cold War period in the general estimations 
of model 3 and for the non-Western versus Western combination in any of the model specifications, 
we find a significant increase in the coefficient sizes of the spatial lag variables for the Islam versus 
Rest and Islam versus West combinations between the two time periods, which is consistent with 
Huntington’s predictions. With several hundred thousand observations, coefficients are easily 
statistically significant. We have therefore also assessed the substantive importance of the estimated 
effects. Here, we found that any rallying effect is only rather modest in size. In sum, while we find 
evidence consistent with Huntington’s predictions, in substantive terms rallying effects seem to be 
of relatively small importance. 
One may also wonder whether there are other explanations for our findings. From a theoretical 
perspective one would expect the very same spatial pattern if, say, radical Islamic groups were not 
rallying in the spirit of a Clash of Civilizations, but competing with each other for scarce resources 
provided by supporters with similar political goals. In other words, competition between terrorist 
groups, which have similar ideologies, for scarce support in terms of finance, logistics and the 
recruitment of terror agents, may force these groups to match successful inter-civilizational terrorist 
attacks of rivaling groups by strengthening their own activities.7 With the data currently available, 
we cannot discriminate between these two explanations, which may of course be both valid at the 
same time. Future research should try to tackle this question, but it is not entirely clear whether this 
                                                 
7
  The fact that empirical evidence is consistent with more than one theory is known as under-
determination. 
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can be successfully done. Micro-level research on the strategic fundraising behavior of different 
terror groups might provide an answer. Needless to say, however, that such research is difficult to 
undertake and potentially dangerous to researchers as well. 
If Huntington’s hypothesis is correct and rallying effects exist particularly amongst Islamic 
terrorist groups, then this makes dealing with the threat they pose very difficult. From the 
perspective of counterterrorism, primarily focusing on a single radical group or a single country is 
not a promising strategy due to the contagion effects. Rather, a broad strategy is needed which 
simultaneously deals with the political and other root causes of radical Islamic terrorism and its 
various manifestations across the Islamic civilization. The traditional counterterrorism strategies 
will be of limited effectiveness in the presence of decentralized groups whose terror spills over into 
terror from other groups with similar ideologies and strategies. 
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